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without having to prove that Subsidiary caused or knew of the
pollution.
The court also rejected Subsidiary's argument that this was an
abuse of the state's police powers. The court held Subsidiary failed to
explain or demonstrate that the DEP's directive would have a severe
economic impact on its business, or that the directive was a physical
intrusion by the government.
Melody Divine

WASHINGTON
Ravenscroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 969 P.2d 75 (Wash. 1998)
(holding that submerged tree stumps which caused plaintiffs injuries
while boating were "artificial" within the meaning of the applicable
statute as a matter of law, but whether stumps represented a "latent"
condition was a question for the trier of fact).
To increase the production of electricity from Long Lake Dam, the
Washington Water Power Company ("WWP") raised the level of water
in Long Lake Reservoir over a period of years. Raising the water level
submerged the bases of trees around the perimeter of the lake. WWP
removed the trees but left their stumps, which, when WWP holds the
reservoir at maximum level, lie below the surface of the water. While
boating on Long Lake Reservoir, the plaintiff was injured when his
motor hit one of the submerged tree stumps. The stump flipped the
motor into the boat, striking the plaintiff in the head and shoulders.
The Washington Supreme Court's analysis turned upon the
Washington recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200-.210. Washington's
Revised Code 4.24.210 exempts landowners from liability for injuries
sustained by the public while recreating on the landowner's property
except where the injury stems from a "known dangerous artificial
latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously
posted."
The purpose of the statute is to encourage landowners to hold
their property open to the public for recreational purposes without
the fear of liability. A landowner's potential for liability is narrow-it
applies only to specific, limited conditions over which the landowner
presumably has more control.
The issues in this case pertaining to the first defendant, WWP, were
whether the stumps created an "artificial" and "latent" condition as a
matter of law, thereby supporting summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiff. The court held that the condition was artificial due to the
"man-made change in the natural condition of the water channel ....
"
The court reasoned WWP created the injury-causing condition by
cutting dead trees down, leaving their stumps near the middle of the
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water channel, raising the level of water covering the stumps, and
failing to place buoys where the stumps remained. The court
reasoned that human effort creates an "artificial" condition.
"Latent," as defined by Washington case law, means "not readily
apparent to the recreational user." An additional inquiry is whether
the injury-causing condition is "readily apparent to the general class of
recreational users, not whether one user might fail to discover it." The
court held the record inconclusive about the latency of the tree
stumps; thus, the issue was a matter of fact precluding summary
judgment.
The dissent disagreed with the court's interpretation of "artificial."
The dissent stated that the purpose of the statute combined with the
statutory language and previous case law dictate that "artificial" should
be construed narrowly; thus, the majority's definition was overbroad
and contrary to the purpose of the statute. The dissent also attacked
the majority's latency analysis.
Against the second defendant, the County of Spokane, the plaintiff
challenged the public duty doctrine's barring of his claim that he was a
third party beneficiary of a funding agreement between the County
and the State Parks and Recreation Commission. In Washington, the
public duty doctrine bars negligence claims by individuals against a
governmental entity absent clear statutory legislative intent to identify
and protect a "particular and circumscribed class of persons"- the
"legislative intent exception." The intent to protect a specific group
must be clearly expressed; it will not be implied. The exception allows
a plaintiff to bring a claim against the governmental entity for statute
violation if the plaintiff can show his or her membership in the clearly
identified class.
Here, the plaintiff argued that an agreement between State Parks
and the County made pursuant to the state boating safety grants and
contracts program defined the duty of the County toward recreational
boaters thereby creating a specific class apart from the public at large.
The court held that the County, in the agreement, did not assume
responsibilities beyond those existing in statutory and tort law;
therefore, the public duty doctrine barred the plaintiffs claim.
Amy Beatie

Wedden H v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998) (holding
that an ordinance banning personal watercraft is not in conflict with
other state law, and does not violate county's police powers or
substantive due process).
After reviewing the negative effects of motorized personal
watercraft (essentially 'jet skis" or "PWCs") on marine life and tourism,
San Juan County passed an ordinance banning the use of them "on all

